The Effects of Household Socio-demographics on Restaurant Threshold Prices by Owusu-Amankwah, Georgette
University of Kentucky 
UKnowledge 
Theses and Dissertations--Agricultural 
Economics Agricultural Economics 
2014 
The Effects of Household Socio-demographics on Restaurant 
Threshold Prices 
Georgette Owusu-Amankwah 
University of Kentucky, gowusuam@gmail.com 
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Owusu-Amankwah, Georgette, "The Effects of Household Socio-demographics on Restaurant Threshold 
Prices" (2014). Theses and Dissertations--Agricultural Economics. 32. 
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/agecon_etds/32 
This Master's Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Agricultural Economics at UKnowledge. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations--Agricultural Economics by an authorized administrator of 
UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu. 
STUDENT AGREEMENT: 
I represent that my thesis or dissertation and abstract are my original work. Proper attribution 
has been given to all outside sources. I understand that I am solely responsible for obtaining 
any needed copyright permissions. I have obtained needed written permission statement(s) 
from the owner(s) of each third-party copyrighted matter to be included in my work, allowing 
electronic distribution (if such use is not permitted by the fair use doctrine) which will be 
submitted to UKnowledge as Additional File. 
I hereby grant to The University of Kentucky and its agents the irrevocable, non-exclusive, and 
royalty-free license to archive and make accessible my work in whole or in part in all forms of 
media, now or hereafter known. I agree that the document mentioned above may be made 
available immediately for worldwide access unless an embargo applies. 
I retain all other ownership rights to the copyright of my work. I also retain the right to use in 
future works (such as articles or books) all or part of my work. I understand that I am free to 
register the copyright to my work. 
REVIEW, APPROVAL AND ACCEPTANCE 
The document mentioned above has been reviewed and accepted by the student’s advisor, on 
behalf of the advisory committee, and by the Director of Graduate Studies (DGS), on behalf of 
the program; we verify that this is the final, approved version of the student’s thesis including all 
changes required by the advisory committee. The undersigned agree to abide by the statements 
above. 
Georgette Owusu-Amankwah, Student 
Dr. Alison Davis, Major Professor 
Dr. Mike Reed, Director of Graduate Studies 
 
 
 
 
The Effects of Household Socio-demographics on Restaurant Threshold Prices 
 
 
THESIS  
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of 
Science in the College of Agriculture, Food and Environment at the University of 
Kentucky 
 
By 
Georgette Owusu-Amankwah 
Lexington, Kentucky 
Director: Dr. Alison Davis, Professor of Agricultural Economics 
Lexington, Kentucky 
2014 
Copyright© Georgette Owusu-Amankwah 2014 
      
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
 
THE EFFECTS OF HOUSEHOLD SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHICS ON RESTAURANT 
THRESHOLD PRICE  
 
This study examines the determinants of a household’s threshold price for a restaurant 
meal cost increase; the level of cost increase that would cause households to either eat in 
restaurants less frequently or change what they would typically purchase. The design of 
the study is formulated using a Tobit model to examine the threshold price by differing 
social, economic and demographic characteristics of households in Kentucky as well as 
their preferences for restaurant-specific characteristics. 
The empirical estimates suggest that households that frequently have dinner at 
restaurants, households with higher incomes and households that strongly prefer full-
service restaurants have a positive threshold price-range; which suggests that such 
households are more willing to pay an additional cost increase in restaurant meals. 
Conversely, households that always notice taxes before paying their checks, households 
close to retirement-age, and households that do not strongly prefer local-food restaurants 
have negative threshold price-range and are consequently less willing to pay an additional 
cost increase in restaurant meals.  
 
KEYWORDS: Food-away-from-home, Restaurant Tax, Socio-demographics, Threshold 
price, Tobit Analysis. 
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Introduction  
Taxing tourism is a cogent alternative for governments facing budgetary constraints and 
pressures to minimize reliance on a variety of taxes since tourism taxes can correct for 
market failure while generating revenue (Gooroochurn & Sinclair 2005). Tourism taxes 
are generally levied on any establishment engaged in the business of providing 
recreational services, food and/ or lodging to transient guests with the aim or revitalizing 
the tourism infrastructure of a city or state. Not all restaurants are engaged in tourism, 
though restaurant taxes may form a relative proportion of tourism tax. 
The debate about restaurant taxes in particular is complex, and prior studies have shed 
light on only some of the relevant issues. Restaurant taxes affect both the distribution of 
income among residents of a city or state as well as between locals and tourists. Like 
most cases, if not set at optimal welfare maximizing levels, restaurant and food taxes can 
be inefficient and inequitable. It is largely suggestive in the literature that taxes should 
comply with the principles of equity and efficiency, with the ability-to-pay principle 
positing that each individual should contribute in line with his/her ability to pay 
(Mustgrave 1959; Gooroochurn 2003; Gooroochurn & Sinclair 2005). However, some 
studies have found some variations of food taxes to be regressive (Drewnowski and 
Darmon, 2005; Leicester and Windmeijer, 2004; Smed, Jenson and Denver, 2007). 
For the principles of equity and efficiency to hold in restaurant taxation, households with 
a higher ability to pay are expected to contribute more than households with a lower 
ability to pay. Regardless, lower income households may be contributing more as a 
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percentage of their incomes to the tax revenue generated than higher income households. 
Moreover, the income group with the largest demand may well be tendering the most to 
the accrued restaurant tax revenue. This follows from economic theory which suggests 
that the greater the proportion of demand by an income segment in total demand, the 
higher their contribution to the total restaurant tax revenue generated. Thus the income 
group with the greatest concentration within a region would invariably register the lion’s 
share of tax revenue generated. 
The questions of the optimal size of the tax and the specific foods on which it should be 
levied (e.g. some or all restaurant meals, high fat-, high sugar- and salt-content meals, 
high-calorific desserts and/or carbonated beverages) remain a source of debate 
(Finkelstein et al., 2010). Economic theory stipulates that an increase in the unit price of a 
normal good could effectively induce a change in the consumption pattern of the agent; a 
reduction in the consumption of the good. Thus we would expect that an increase in the 
tax/price of restaurant meals would culminate in a decrease in demand of restaurant 
meals. However, the households’ oblivion or awareness of the existence or adoption of an 
additional levied tax may cause them to demand the same quantity or even more 
especially if the additional tax is discretionary and relatively minute. 
Jacobson and Brownwell (2000) observe mixed opinions in the literature about the 
feasibility of a steep tax and thus suggest that even small taxes on widely consumed 
foods can generate substantial revenue. Similarly, Andreyeva et al. (2010) suggest that 
the power of small taxes/price changes applied to broad-based widely consumed foods 
and foods most responsive to price changes (e.g. restaurant meals)  have effects that 
accumulate across a population and thus can also raise substantial revenues. The results 
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of the said authors indicate that small taxes could reduce consumption by a considerable 
amount. On the other hand Finkelstein, Zhen, Nonnemaker and Todd (2010) explore 
large (20% and 40%) tax increases and yet find modest effects on foods expenditures; 
less than $30 per households per year on average. Finkelstein et al. suggest that large 
taxes have more potential to influence consumption outcomes especially for middle-
income households and could also generate higher revenues.      
 A number of studies have provided estimates price elasticity of demand for different 
types of FAFH (Richards and Mancino, 2011) while others have examined the effects of 
taxes on food consumption habits and outcomes (Cast et al., 2005, Powell et al., 2009). 
The underlying objective of this study is to examine the threshold-price (TP); the % 
increase in cost of restaurant meals that would cause consumers to alter their 
purchasing/expenditure behavior. With the aid of survey data, the study examines 
percentage increases in cost of meals that would cause different socio-demographic 
households to either eat in restaurants less frequently or change what they typically 
purchase in restaurants.           
 
Background Study on Restaurant Meal Tax                   
 
Restaurant Food Expenditure Patterns 
The literature indicates that price is a significant determinant of food choices and 
restaurant choice and frequency. Data from experimental studies show that, second only 
to taste, food price is one of the most influential factors in determining food choice 
(Glanz et al., 1998, French, 2003) thus food price manipulations are increasingly being 
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considered as economic strategies and incentives for influencing food choices that 
consumers make (Popkin, Duffey and Gordon-Larsen, 2011; Powell, 2009). Persons 
facing stricter economic constraints will preferentially select lower-cost energy-dense 
diets rather than abandon their usual eating habits, thus strategies for influencing meal 
choice ought to take food preferences and the usual eating habits into account 
(Drewnowski and Darmon, 2005).  
Data from the USDA Continuing Survey of Food Intakes by Individuals show that 56% 
of US adults report eating away from home on any given day; of these, about 33% ate at 
a fast food outlet. The number of restaurants and eating establishments has more than 
tripled over the past couple of decades with a continued increase in demand for them and 
a simultaneous downward trend in per capita expenditures for food at home (FAH) as a 
portion of per capita personal consumption expenditures (McCracken and Brandt, 1987). 
In the early 1970s, about 20% of the household food dollar was spent on food away from 
home. By 1995, an estimated 40% of the US household food dollar was spent on food 
away from home (Putnam and Allshouse, 1996). The proportion of expenditures spent on 
food-away-from-home (FAFH) has vastly increased, as the consumption of purchased 
meals away from home has become more frequent relative to food consumed at home 
(Lee and Brown, 1986).  
Tax Targeting; At-Risk Populations 
Socio-demographic data have the benefit of being accessible, less ambiguous, and less 
expensive to gather; however, the variables are of limited value unless they are clearly 
and explicitly related to important consumer behavioral attributes such as 
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expenditure/consumption behavior or demand, thus facilitating the decision and 
implementation of specific economic and marketing strategies (Cai, 1998). The changes 
in household composition and shifts in the population have been accompanied by 
changing consumer spending behaviors (Jacobs & Shipp, 1990; Kotler, 1995).  
Rising food prices cause low-income consumers to change their demand far more than 
high-income consumers (Jones, 1997). The average American spends less than $8.00/d 
on food and beverages, with low-income families spending as little as $25 per person per 
week (Putnam et al., 2002). Opponents of targeted tax are often concerned about the 
extent to which the tax disproportionately affects lower-income households (Finkelstein 
et al, 2010). There are mixed opinions on the feasibility and desirability of a steep tax 
whereas a small tax may be more feasible and still could generate significant revenues for 
“quality of life expenditures” that support tourism, recreation and economic development.  
The proportion of a household budget allocated to all food tends to decline with 
increasing income. Thus taxes on food and food items may be regressive since they have 
a higher impact on low-income households than the affluent. In a related study, the very 
poorest 2% of the population were found to spend seven times more of their total income 
on a food tax than the rich; the middle class would pay around 0.25% (a quarter) of their 
total income on the food tax; while the richest would pay less than 0.1% of their income 
on the food tax (Liecester and Windmeijer, 2004). This is however the case for UK and 
might be subtly different for the US. All in all tax and price increases have a more subtle 
effect on the purchasing behavior of the wealthier and most educated than on other socio-
demographic groups (Smed et al., 2007).  
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Proposed Uses of Restaurant Tax  
Restaurant taxes have been considered as a strategy for generating substantial revenue as 
well as promoting tourism. The actual implementation of any tax requires specific criteria 
as one cannot simply instruct retailers and restaurateurs to tax the least purchased food 
items while excluding the more highly demanded foods and vice versa (Cash and 
Lacanilao, 2007). Thus specific guidelines as to what categories of food will be included 
and which will not be affected must be developed (Cash et al., 2007). 
The sales tax for most jurisdictions goes into a general fund. In some cases however, the 
sales or other specifically applied food tax revenues are apportioned for diverse special 
projects. Rhode Island initially earmarked a portion of its sales tax revenue for 
environmental management and litter control; Virginia uses a portion of its sales tax and 
other specifically applied food taxes for litter control and recycling distributors based on 
total sales of fund; West Virginia uses its soft-drink-tax revenues to support its medical, 
dental, and nursing schools; Tennessee uses a portion of its special-food-tax revenues to 
help clean up highways; while Washington pursues violence prevention and drug 
enforcement with its soft-drinks tax (Jacobson and Brownell, 2000). 
In the state of Kentucky specifically, where this research is focused on, the KY League of 
Cities (KLC) suggests that for any allowable jurisdiction imposing a restaurant tax, the 
money set aside for tourism promotion will lead to more visitations and therefore more 
revenue for businesses. The bill recommends that up to 75% of the tax may be used for 
quality of life expenditures that support tourism, recreation, and economic development 
with a minimum of 25% going to the local tourist and convention commissions. 
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Current State & Local Restaurant Taxes  
Kentucky’s cities are divided into six classes based on their population. Enacted 
legislation in July 1992, KRS 91A.400, in the Commonwealth of Kentucky allowed 4
th
 
and 5
th
 class cities to levy a tax on restaurant meal purchases with all funds authorized to 
be turned over to the tourist & convention commission in the city. The tax levied was not 
to exceed 3% of retail sales of restaurants operating with the cities’ jurisdiction. The tax 
levied on 4
th
 and 5
th
 cities affected 54% of the cities in Kentucky. For that matter the tax 
did not affect the largest 8% of Kentucky’s cities which are classified as 1st and 2nd class 
cities. Thus cities like Louisville and Lexington, which are 1
st
 and 2
nd
 class cities 
respectively, did not fall within the tax net of the legislation. 
In recent years however, the State Legislature has proposed an amendment to KRS 
91A.400 to extend the restaurant tax reach not only to 4
th
 and 5
th
 class cities but all cities  
in Kentucky irrespective of its size. The Bill would allow all cities, urban-county 
governments, consolidated local governments, unified local governments, and charter 
county governments to charge a restaurant tax. A tax of up to 3% would be imposed on 
the meals people eat in a restaurant or the carryout orders people pick up, on top of the 
6% current state sales tax. The proposal is part of the Kentucky League of Cities 2014 
Legislative Agenda as a way to get additional revenue for cities (Kentucky Legislature, 
2014). 
The proposed restaurant tax is gaining momentum in the state legislature, but the bill has 
yet to be pre-filed. Kentucky Restaurant Association is opposed to the plan and believes 
consumers should be as well, since most local restaurant owners are most likely to pass 
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that cost on to their consumers. According to one restaurant owner “the bottom line is 
that the 3 percent is going to affect each family another $150 a year, and again, change 
some people's decisions to go out and eat" (WDRB News, 2014).  
Summary 
Research on the effect of taxes on restaurant food choices have raised a number of 
questions - including the optimal size of the tax and the level of tax that alters food 
choice and food expenditure behavior - which have not thoroughly been addressed. The 
emphasis of this study is on analyzing and estimating the effects of restaurant cost 
increases on restaurant meal choice and frequency among households in Kentucky while 
controlling for the different socio-demographic characteristics and restaurant preferences 
of the households. The understanding and assessment of the tax effects on consumer 
behavior is both critical and relevant for local and state government bodies, independent 
restaurants, chain restaurants, restaurant representative bodies and tourism 
services/industry in making and implementing important legislative and strategic 
business/marketing decisions for all stakeholders at hand.  
The study is organized into the following chapters. Chapter 2 addresses the motivation, 
objective and problem statement of the study; Chapter 3 focuses on a review of the 
literature; Chapter 4 draws out a conceptual model of the study; Chapter 5 looks at the 
data and methodology used in the study; Chapter 6 breaks down the results and findings 
of the study; and Chapter 7 gives a discussion on the overview of the implications of the 
study and makes suggestions on future research. 
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Problem Statement 
Legislation has been proposed in Kentucky that would authorize city legislative bodies to 
impose a tax on restaurant meals of no more than 3%, regardless of the size of the city. 
The bill has gained attention and interest from Kentucky Travel Industry Association 
(KTIA), the Kentucky Restaurant Association (KRA), and local tourism and restaurant 
organizations and associations. The KRA believes restaurant demand is sensitive to 
economic fluctuations - may cause significant falls in revenues as consumers react to 
price increase - and thus oppose the tax. The KTIA is split on the matter while the 
Kentucky League of Cities, an organization that represents the interests of city 
governments, supports the tax. Extensive research has been published on the effects of 
food price changes on demand for food and beverages yet substantial gaps exist in the 
research base. To gain a comprehensive understanding of consumer food choice 
behavior, the existing gaps as to the level of tax that elicits changes in the expenditure 
and choice behaviors of households must be filled. Current data on the effects of income 
distribution - with regards to assessments of differences in responsiveness to food prices 
according to age, education, culture or ethnicity - are limited (Andreyeva et al. 2010). 
The underlying purpose of this study is to examine how cost increases in restaurant meals 
affect demand for food-away-from-home in Kentucky by socio-demographic 
characteristics and restaurant preferences of the population.  
Motivation and Objective 
Food prices are already heavily affected, in much of the world by existing taxes, trade 
restrictions, transportation policy, energy taxes, food assistance programs, environmental 
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policies and other interventions (Cash et al., 2007). Each consumer makes food choices 
so as to maximize the direct utility associated with food consumption. Consumption takes 
place until the marginal utility (reduced hunger, satisfaction or enjoyment) of one 
additional unit of food is greater or equal to the marginal cost. The marginal utility, 
although positive, diminishes as more food is consumed (Drewnowski et al., 2005). 
Philipson et al. (2004) note that “individuals make food choices in the context of limited 
time and income available in the presence of competing goods with the objective of 
attaining multiple outcomes”, only one of which is satisfaction. 
It is imperative to note that there is still no consensus on whether taxes have a true causal 
effect on the choice of restaurants and the meals they offer. There is accumulating 
evidence, contrary to the full optimization assumption, that suggests that agents are 
inattentive to information and thus have delayed initial response (DellaVigna and Pollet 
2009). Thus the main objective of the study is to tease out the price thresholds within 
which different households would or would not change their purchasing and consumption 
behavior at restaurants, following cost increases in restaurant meals. 
Research Questions 
In this study we focus solely on restaurant meals in our bid to forecast tax effects. The 
research question seeks to analyze how restaurant taxes affect demand for food-away-
from-home (FAFH) among different social, economic and demographic households in 
Kentucky. To put the research questions in perspective I define threshold price as the 
percentage increase in the cost of restaurant meals that would cause consumers to eat less 
frequently at the restaurant or change what they would typically purchase. 
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The sub-questions underlying the analysis of tax threshold price on socio-demographic 
characteristics of households in Kentucky are as follows: 
1: Is the threshold price of restaurant food more price/cost sensitive for low income 
earners than for high income households and across consumers as a whole? 
2: Are younger people more responsive to restaurant tax than older/retired (60+) 
consumers?  (Do elderly households have lower economic status as determined by 
income and expenditure- effects of the aging population on restaurant food purchases and 
consumption?) 
3: Are consumer households who notice all restaurant taxes charged more likely to have a 
higher threshold price?  
4: Is the preference for local foods independent of price/tax increases and the threshold 
price of households? 
In essence the research questions look at how four main socio-demographic and 
restaurant characteristics - income, age, awareness of restaurant taxes and preference for 
local foods - influence restaurant threshold price of households. 
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Review of the Literature  
This literature review is organized into sections. The first section reviews empirical 
evidence supporting the theories of tax/price increases in relation to socio-demographic 
characteristics of households. The second section focuses on demand for food segmented 
by income groups. The third section reviews restaurant expenditure patterns of senior 
households. The fourth section explores price premiums for local foods and the fifth 
section addresses the sensitivity of restaurant and meal choice to price/tax increases.   
Observed links between price/tax, socioeconomic groups and restaurant 
choice, and restaurant spending 
The impact of price/tax instruments has generally been found to be stronger for lower 
social classes than in other groups of the population (Smed et al., 2007). The literature 
suggests that education increases the likelihood of FAFH decision (Ham et al., 1998) and 
has a positive effect on expenditures on FAFH (Abdel-Ghany & Sharpe, 1997; Ham et 
al., 2003; 2004; Mihalopoulos & Demoussis, 2001; Soberon-Ferrer & Dardis, 1991). 
Smed et al. (2007) find that younger age-groups decrease their demand for food on which 
saturated fats are taxed than older age-groups. Although there is no clear evidence that 
household size affects the of threshold price, previous studies have found household size 
to contribute positively to the level of expenditure of FAFH (Hiemstra & Kim, 1995; 
Nayga & Capps, 1992; Yen, 1993).  
Based on the theories of consumer behavior and household production, Cai (1998) 
applies a Tobit modeling procedure to investigate the relationship between vacation food 
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expenditures and household socio-demographic characteristics. He used a sample size of 
3,176 observations obtained from the interview data of the 1992-1993 Consumer 
Expenditure Survey conducted by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). He found 
that aside from residency, all the examined household characteristics contribute to the 
explanation of vacation food expenditure. When the total marginal effects of the variables 
were standardized and ranked it became clear that the change in food spending amount is 
most affected by employment status, followed by education, seasonality, occupation, 
ethnicity, housing tenure, marital status, age, presence of two or more earners, earned 
income and unearned income. The number of children in the household had the least (and 
negative) effect.  
In a related study, Brown and Lee (1986) use a switching regression technique, for 
examining food expenditures at and away from home. The authors use data from the 
USDA’s Nationwide Food Consumption Survey for the statistical analysis. The estimated 
income as a result of the probit model indicates that the higher a household’s income the 
more likely they are to eat away from home. Their regional dummy indicates that 
households located in suburban areas are more likely to eat away from home than those 
in rural areas or central cities. Households with an employed female head, a more 
educated female head, whites, the presence of males between 4-26 and females between 
4-50 years old increase the likelihood that the household will eat away from home.  
Using logit analysis, Nayga and Capps (1992) investigate the decision to eat FAFH, by 
estimating a model in which the likelihood of eating away from home is a function of a 
set of predetermined socioeconomic and demographic variables. Approximately 73% of 
the individuals in their sample were correctly classified as either consuming or not 
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consuming FAFH using the logit specification. The authors found no statistical 
significance between the likelihood that males or females eat FAFH.  They also found 
that individuals who are employed compared to the unemployed are more likely to eat 
FAFH. On the other hand, blacks and Hispanics compared to whites, food-stamp 
recipients, individuals on special diets and larger household are less likely to eat FAFH. 
Their results show that the likelihood of consuming FAFH decreases with age but 
increases with income. They also find that the probability of consuming FAFH is higher 
on weekends than on weekdays.  
French, Harnack and Jeffery (2000) examine demographic, behavioral and dietary 
correlates of the frequency of fast food restaurant use in a community-based sample of 
891 adult women. Their results showed that 21% of the sample reported eating three or 
more fast food restaurant meals per week, with the frequency of fast food restaurant use 
being higher among younger women, those with lower income, non-White ethnicity, 
greater body weight, lower dietary restraint, fewer low-fat eating behaviors, and greater 
television viewing. Over a three year intervention trial period, increases in frequency of 
fast food restaurant use were associated with increases in body weight, total energy 
intake, percentage fat intake and with decreases in physical activity, dietary restraint and 
low-fat eating behaviors. However, the intake of several other foods, including fruits and 
vegetables, did not differ by frequency of fast food restaurant use. 
Gordon-Larsen, Guilkey, and Popkin (2011) use negative binomial regression models and 
nationally representative, longitudinal data to examine how community-level food price 
variation was associated with individual-level fast food intake by race/ethnicity and 
income. They found relatively stronger statistical association between food prices and 
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fast food intake for males than females and significantly lower intake for non-whites 
relative to whites. In particular, in the group with the strongest associations (black males), 
a 20% increase in price of soda was associated with a decrease of a 0.25 visits to a fast 
food restaurant per week. Furthermore, there was a relatively greater inverse change in 
individual-level fast food intake with income, such that bigger changes in individual-level 
fast food intake were seen at low income level, with greatest association in blacks. Thus 
increases in community-level prices of fast food were associated with reductions in 
individual-level fast food consumption and reduction of approximately one-quarter visits 
to a fast food restaurant per week. 
The analysis of the impact of food taxes on the quality of meals is studied by Smd et al. 
(2007), who use price elasticities calculated from parameters estimated in econometric 
demand system models of food demand for five social classes and seven age groups. 
Weekly household panel data from Consumer-scan, spanning the period from January 
1997 to December 2000 (approximately 2000 households) were used for the analysis. 
The authors operate their tax instruments on two different levels; taxes/subsidies levied 
directly on food commodities and taxes/subsidies that are levied on the nutrients 
contained in foods are analyzed. The resulting change in demand for each socio-
demographic group is then predicted from the price elasticities calculated from the food-
demand models. The results suggest that food demand choices are independent of prices 
for the group with the highest income, while the lower social classes have the largest 
demand/expenditure decreases in the advent of the imposed taxes. Also expenditure 
decreases were mostly found in household below 50 years of age reflecting the 
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willingness to adjust food demand in the short term for relatively younger households 
compared to aging households. 
Demand for food segmented by income  
In the United States, where visible changes have occurred in income distribution, 
commodity demand projections and tax strategies should be based on individual income 
strata rather than on average estimates of price and income elasticities (Park et al., 1996). 
Previous studies show that household income significantly and positively influences 
FAFH participation and expenditure (Ham et al., 2003&2004; Hiemstra & Kim, 1995; 
Jensen & Yen, 1996; Nayga & Capps, 1992; Nayga, 1996; Yen, 1993). Lower-income 
households may respond differently to changes in price (tax) than higher-income 
households, just as it is reasonable to expect different levels of subsistence expenditure 
for groups segmented by income (Park, Holcomb, Raper & Capps, 1996).  
Park et al (1996) use data from the 1987-88 Nationwide Consumption Survey (NFCS) 
which provided detailed records on the money value, quality and type of foods purchased 
by the household over a one-week period. They use 12 aggregate commodity groups 
including FAFH as one of the commodity groups. Park et al. partitioned the data into two 
income classes. The basis for their segmentation was the 1987-88 poverty guidelines 
developed by the US Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) and adapted 
from poverty thresholds published by the Bureau of Census. Partitioning the data resulted 
in the creation of a first poverty status group of 782 households with an average annual 
before-tax income of $6,850 and a second non-poverty status group with 3,087 
households with an average annual after-tax income of $33,244, indicating that one-fifth 
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of the sample households were eligible for government food aid. They find expenditure 
elasticity for FAFH to be positive and greater than one for both groups, but the income 
elasticity of FAFH is positive and greater than one only for the poverty status group. 
Thus they conclude that FAFH is a luxury good for poverty status group but a normal 
good for the non-poverty status group. Overall their poverty status group was more 
responsive to changes in income than the non-poverty group.  
Finkelstein et al, 2010 investigate the differential impact of targeted beverage taxes on 
higher- and lower-income households. They use data from Nielsen Homescan panel, 
which includes a national sample of households that scan and transmit their store-bought 
food and beverages weekly for a 12-month period. They use multivariate regression 
models to predict the effects of 20% and 40% price increases by estimating the 
association between changes in monthly beverage prices and changes in kilocalories 
purchased. The first part of their 2-part model estimates a logistic regression on the 
probability of positive purchases in a given month as a function of average monthly 
prices in the market for each beverage category and other covariates; while the second 
part estimates a regression of the same prices and covariates on log-kilocalories (per 
person per day) for households with positive purchases. The tax simulations were piloted 
by raising the relevant prices faced by each household either by 20% or 40% and using 
the model coefficients to estimate reductions in kilocalories purchased as a result of the 
tax. They then used the predictions from the tax simulations to estimate per capita and 
aggregate tax revenue by income quartile resulting from each tax strategy. Their results 
showed that a 20% and 40% tax on all sugar-sweetened beverages would reduce per 
capita purchases by an average of 10 and 17.1 kilocalories respectively. Middle-income 
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households had the largest estimated reductions in kilocalories as a result of the tax while 
the lowest and highest income quartiles were not statistically different from 0. A 20% tax 
raised $1.5 billion per year in revenue while a 40% tax generated annual revenue of $2.5 
billion. Lower-income households purchase more sugar-sweetened beverages than 
higher-income households but since they make purchases at a lower average price (e.g. 
make purchases in lower ta nbxed/less affluent neighborhoods) and are more sensitive to 
prices their share of the tax was less than that of higher income households. For a 40% 
tax imposed, lowest income households would pay 20%, middle income households 
would pay 25%, whilst the highest income households would pay 30% of the tax. 
FAFH expenditure of senior households  
The proportion of elderly/retires in America’s population has been increasing; it was 
11.3% in  1980, 12.6% in 1990 and 14% in 2010; while its estimated that by 2050 a 
fourth of America’s population will be over 65 (Abdel-Ghany & Sharpe, 1997). The 
definition of senior consumers vary by researcher; some consider 55 years and older as a 
senior group (Fleischer & Pizam, 2002; Hong et al., 1999) while others view those 65 and 
older as seniors (Abdel-Ghany & Sharpe, 1997). The literature generally concurs that 
retirees spend less on food-away-from-home (Blisard and Baylock, 1994; Chen and Cho, 
1982; Ketkar and Cho 1982).  
Adel-Ghany and Sharpe use data on 2,810 elderly households drawn from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics 1990 Consumer Expenditure Survey to conduct a Multivariate Tobit 
analysis. Instead of treating the elderly as a homogenous group they examine spending 
pattern differences between households with a reference person aged 65-74 (young-old) 
and aged 75 and above (old-old). They test whether there are differences in spending 
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patterns between the two age groups while controlling for the influence of selected socio-
demographic variables and then examine the influence of the select socio-demographic 
variables on the significantly different expenditure categories. Total expenditures were 
higher for the younger group, at $21,333, compared to $15,985 for the older group. They 
find significant differences in spending patterns between the two groups of households 
for ten expenditure categories including expenditures on food-at-home and food-away-
from-home. Expenditures on food away from home were significantly higher for elderly 
households whose reference person had completed high school compared to households 
where the reference person did not have a high school degree. The older households 
whose reference had some college education spent significantly more on both food at 
home and food away from home compared to their counterparts without a high school 
degree. Urban west elderly residents spent significantly more than elderly rural residents 
on food at home.  
In general, higher levels of education were significantly associated with relatively larger 
numbers of expenditure categories than lower levels of education. They found that 
expenditures by households in either age group varied positively with household size for 
food at home. Young-old unmarried male-headed households spent relatively more on 
FAFH and significantly less on FAH. From the Tobit model they obtained the marginal 
propensities (the change in expenditure on a specific category given a change in total 
expenditures) to spend for all cases which included cases above the limit as well for cases 
at the limit. The young-old age household had higher marginal propensities to spend both 
on food at home and food away from home compared to the old-old age group. 
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Taking the analysis of the food choices and consumption pattern of senior households 
further, Jang et al. (2007) investigate the association of demographic and socioeconomic 
variables with food away from home expenditures among senior households. They 
examine the two stage nature of the FAFH decision using Heckman’s double hurdle 
approach. The first step was a probit regression to estimate the probability of FAFH 
participation; the decision as to whether to consume FAFH or not. The second step was to 
predict FAFH expenditure; the decision how much to spend on FAFH using a truncated 
regression with the inverse mills ratio for correcting sample selection bias. They use data 
obtained from the fourth-quarter interview component of the Consumer Expenditure 
Survey, compiled by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, which provides a continuous and 
comprehensive flow of information about consumer expenditure patterns of US 
households. Their results indicate that socio-demographic characteristics are more useful 
in understanding the FAFH participation decision of senior households, whilst financial 
resources, availability and access to restaurants are better predictors of FAFH 
expenditures.  They find that average senior households may control their overall FAFH 
budget more due to their reduced discretionary income. They however find that even 
though graduate-educated seniors were less likely to dine out, they tended to spend 
significantly more on FAFH once the FAFH decision was made. Also senior households 
that spend more on FAH spent more on FAFH as well demonstrating that FAH may 
represent food quality and not a substitute good. Thus the senior households who pay 
attention to food quality at home will be significantly more interested in consuming 
quality FAFH as well.  
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Local Foods and Tax Choke Premiums 
Local foods are broadly identified according to dimensions of place and space. The 
attributes of local foods include place of origin, uniqueness of the product and physical 
access (driving distance) to the product within a geographic location. These attributes 
reinforce the perceived benefits and desire for freshness, quality, knowledge of the 
product source and support for the local economy among other factors. Consumers may 
indicate the level of price or taxes on local foods that would cause them change their 
consumption pattern, but in a real-world situation their actual purchasing behavior may 
diverge from their originally stated expenditure behavior. Ortiz (2010) analyzes the actual 
price premiums that consumers are willing to pay for menu’s featuring local products in a 
restaurant setting and evaluates the extent of commitment the consumers have towards 
paying the price premiums. The findings suggest higher marginal monetary contributions 
to the restaurant selling local menu offerings at a premium price. 
Similarly, Sharma and Strohben (2006) analyze the economic impacts of using local 
foods in restaurants. They compute the total costs of using local foods in restaurant 
operation and compare with the operational costs of other national vendors. Food costs 
per pound purchased were averagely lower for local foods ($3.80) as compared to 
national vendors ($4.30). Given various menu choices at three price options, 41% of all 
participants chose the local food item on the menu while a fourth agreed to pay a price 
premium of $2 (36% above average prices). Out of all the participants 45% chose the 
menu without any price premium, while 31% chose the menu option with a premium of 
$1 (18% higher than regular average prices). Their findings suggest that consumers are 
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more willing to support premium prices for local foods, when made aware of local menu 
offerings and given the choice to do so. In other words, local foods can be priced higher.  
Is the choice of restaurants and restaurant meals price /tax sensitive?  
Are food demand choices independent of prices/taxes? A study by Andreyeva, Long and 
Brownwell (2010) reviewing 160 studies on the price elasticity of demand for 16 major 
food and beverage categories, revealed that food away from home was the most 
responsive to price changes thus suggesting larger relative changes in consumer 
purchases. Demand for food is relatively inelastic yet the effects of a small tax/price 
change on foods that are very responsive to such changes accumulate across a population 
(Andreyeva et al). Low-income households exhibit more substitution within commodity 
aggregates than households with higher incomes as price elasticities for all goods are 
lower for the upper social classes and some price elasticities are even non-significant 
(Smed et al., 2007). 
When price of restaurant meals increase, either by legislative proposed tax or increased 
restaurant costs, consumers may either consume more of restaurant meals (while 
consuming less of some other good), may consume the same amount as they previously 
did or they may consume less. The overall total effect would depend on whether the 
income effect or substitution effect is stronger. The consumers may either substitute one 
restaurant for the other or one meal for the other (cheaper or untaxed meals). How much 
consumption would change would also be dependent on the tax level and the consumer’s 
awareness of it. 
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Summary 
While previous work gives little insight into the level of taxes that causes consumers to 
change their consumption pattern at restaurants, it indicates a relationship between 
consumer’s socio-demographic characteristics, restaurant consumption/expenditure 
pattern as well as the economic impact. This paper builds on the previous literature. 
Using a Tobit model we analyze the level of tax that would cause consumers to eat less 
frequently at restaurants or change the meal that they would typically consume; we 
examine the socio-demographic characteristics and restaurant preference of the 
restaurants consumers mostly affected by the tax.  
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Conceptual model 
Demand for a market good or services can be derived as a function of household 
variables such as household income, value of time as a measure of the household’s 
opportunity cost, and other household characteristics (Lancaster, 1966, 1971). This 
section discusses the concept of threshold price. The conceptual model for this study is a 
theoretical framework representing the quantitative relationship between our dependent 
variable of threshold price and the relevant behavioral and socio-demographic variables. 
The model serves two main functions: first, a simplification and abstraction from our 
observed data and second, selection of data based on economic theory. 
Introduction 
The basic theorem underlying the concept of demand asserts that when the price/cost of a 
good or service (restaurant meals in our case) increases, the rational consumer would 
demand a lesser quantity of the said good or service. In essence the amount of the 
commodity that the consumer is willing to purchase at a certain price falls in response to 
the price/cost increase. This reflects the inverse relationship between price and quantity 
demanded of goods and services. Demand however remains unaffected (constant).  
I hypothesize that for every unit increase in the cost of restaurant meals, there is not an 
exact, corresponding decrease in quantity demanded of restaurant meals. However, 
beyond the consumer’s threshold price for the restaurant meal, then the consumer’s 
quantity demanded of restaurant meals ultimately falls. 
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Key Concepts 
There is a psychological component to consumers’ perception of prices. Threshold price 
in economic literature refers to the fixing of prices to draw a consumer up to a certain 
threshold.  I theorize that for a unit increase in the cost of restaurant meals, the level of 
satisfaction of the consumer may restrict his/her quantity demanded from falling. Thus 
for the purposes of our study we redefine the threshold price point as the point beyond 
which a cost increase in restaurant meals that would cause a consumer to eat less 
frequently at the restaurant or change the meal that they would typically purchase. Thus it 
relates cost increases to changes in consumer behavior and consumption.  
Economics, marketing and advertising analysts note that consumers have “dead-zones” 
within which they don’t discriminate between higher and lower price points. We 
subsequently refer to threshold price-range as the range within which in the event of a 
price increase in the cost of a restaurant meal, the expenditure behavior of the consumer 
would not change. In essence this captures the minute region where the consumers 
demand for the restaurant meal is relatively inelastic. Thus if the consumer is within the 
threshold price-range and the cost of restaurant meals increase, the consumer would 
continue to consume the same quantity as previously demanded. However, when the 
consumer moves to the end of the threshold price-range, he/she reaches the threshold 
price, above which expenditure behavior is subject to change.  
Theoretical Model 
By the law of demand, a price increase leads to a fall in quantity demanded (Krugman 
and Wells, 2005). Consumers generally respond to price increases by reducing the 
quantity demanded of a commodity, good or service. They either decrease their quantity 
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demanded by a small amount or by a large amount. The degree of responsiveness of 
quantity demanded to changes in price is referred to as price elasticity of demand 
(Krugman and Wells, 2005). This number measures, for instance, by how much a 
household would reduce their quantity demanded for restaurant meals if the cost of 
restaurant meals increases. Pauwels, Srinivasan and Franses (2007) assess the impact of 
price thresholds on price elasticities.  
The price elasticity of demand numerically values the percent change in quantity 
demanded as a result of this price change along the demand curve (Krugman and Wells, 
2005). A sufficient condition for the existence of Threshold price is that the consumer 
demand curve has points of inelasticity along it (the demand curve). More negative 
values signify higher price sensitivity and thus a less willingness to pay for tax, price or 
meal cost increases. Conversely, positive values signify a less price sensitivity and thus a 
higher likelihood of paying for restaurant tax, price or meal cost increases. 
Figure 4.1 shows a hypothetical restaurant scenario where prices increase from P0 to P1 
and then to P2.  Points A’, B’ and C’ reflect inelastic points along the consumers threshold 
range.  
We show this proposition with the aid of the diagram below: 
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The first diagram in Figure 4.1 above is the conventional demand curve, which reflects 
prices on the y-axis and corresponding quantities demanded on the x-axis. The second 
diagram in Figure 4.1 provides/proposes a slightly modified version with slight step-like 
irregular kinks along the demand schedule to emphasize the concept of threshold price. 
When restaurant prices increase from P0 to P1, conventional demand predicts that quantity 
demand for restaurant meals would fall from X1 to X2. However in the modified demand 
curve, if the consumer is within his/her threshold price-range (vertical portion of the 
demand curve) quantity demanded may not fall in response to price increases. At point 
A’ and B’, demand remains at X’1 when prices increase from P0 to P1. Thus in the 
modified demand schedule, demand for restaurant meals remains elastic at X’1 after the 
hypothetical cost increase in restaurant meals. However, an increase in price to P2 goes 
beyond the threshold price to point C’ and the consumer reduces quantity demanded to 
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Figure 4.1 Conventional and Modified Demand Schedule 
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X2. Thus beyond the threshold price consumers alter their expenditure behavior there-by 
demanding less of restaurant meals or changing what they would typically purchase.  
Factors That Affect or Predict Threshold price 
The desire to use restaurant services may be motivated by several reasons including 
family celebrations, leisure, business and the ease of not having to cook (Pedraja and 
Yague, 2001). Restaurant characteristics have been found to affect meal duration and 
spending (Kimes and Robson, 2004). Pauwels et al. (2007) examine category and brand 
characteristics that might influence the presence, nature and size of price thresholds and 
price elasticity differences. This section highlights the factors that affect the threshold 
price or threshold range of consumers. We broadly categorize the exogenous factors that 
affect, influence and predict the threshold price of consumers’ restaurant meals into 
household socio-demographic characteristics and preference for specific restaurant 
characteristics. These characteristics make the threshold range wider or narrower.  
 
Figure 4.2 Factors Affecting Threshold Prices 
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The household socio-demographic characteristics that influence threshold price include 
consumers’ income, education, gender, marital status, county of residence, rural or urban 
location and number of persons in the household. The restaurant characteristics that affect 
consumers’ threshold price include chain restaurants over independent restaurants, full-
service over fast-casual service, quality of food and service, local food, menu variety and 
portion sizes offered at the restaurant. 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Characteristics Influencing Threshold Price 
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The interaction of different socio-demographic characteristics and preferences of 
restaurant characteristics for the consumer culminates in varying threshold prices and 
demand schedules for each consumer.  
Summary 
The contribution of this study to the literature is that it applies the concept of 
threshold price to restaurant taxes. The study explores the cost increase of restaurant 
meals that would cause consumers to patronize less of the restaurant meals or change 
what they would usually consume. I term/call this the consumer’s threshold price. 
The introduction of a restaurant tax may reduce present, near term and even future 
threshold price and consumption.  
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Research Methodology 
Data Description, Subjects and Procedure 
The study relies on a survey
1
 designed to elicit changes in the demand pattern of 
consumers’ dining in restaurants in relation to changes in the cost of restaurant meals. 
The survey was conducted online and administered to adult consumers living within the 
counties of Kentucky. The target population was Kentucky adults over 18 years of age, 
estimated to be 3,315,996 in 2012 (US Census Bureau). 
The survey contained sections on consumer eating patterns/habits; frequency of eating in 
restaurants and the average cost per meal. On a scale of 0 to 60 respondents were asked to 
select by how much the cost of restaurant meals would have to increase before they 
would eat in a restaurant less frequently or change what they typically purchase in 
restaurants. The respondents were also presented with two scenarios in which they were 
allowed to specify their preference for chain restaurants over independent restaurants; 
fast-casual/quick-service; quality of service and food; local variety of foods and portion 
sizes served when there was no change in cost of restaurant meals compared to a 3% 
increase. This section was designed to elicit the change of behavior between 
regular demand and an associated increase in restaurant taxes. Socio-
demographic characteristics were also collected in the final section of the survey.  
                                                          
1
 See Han J. (2013) for details of the survey. 
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The response rate of the survey was 22%. Out of all respondents 1,252 respondents fully 
completed the entire survey. The survey population was 37% male and 63% female. In 
general, higher income households were represented more in the survey response than 
other income groups in the population. 
Measures  
The following measures were self-reported by each respondent.  
 Behavioral Variables 
Typically eat in restaurants. This is a dummy variable which captures whether the 
respondent typically eats in a restaurant at least once a month or not. As a precursor, this 
question sets the stage for the subsequent questions in the survey. Of the 1,162 sampled 
respondents being used for this study, all affirmed that they eat in a restaurant at least 
once a month.  
Frequency of eating in restaurants variable captures the number of times the respondent 
eats in a restaurant per month. On a scale of 0 to 20 respondents were asked to indicate 
how many times, on average, that they eat breakfast, lunch and/or dinner per month in 
restaurants.  
Cost per meal is a variable which captures the average cost of a typical meal. 
Respondents were given ranges and asked to indicate their average cost of breakfast, 
lunch and dinner at restaurants. 
Higher neighborhood tax is a binary variable indicative of whether the respondent would 
opt for restaurants in lower tax communities. Respondents were asked ‘if tax rates on 
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restaurant meals in one community were 3% to 5% higher than in a neighboring 
community, would this cause you to choose restaurants in communities with lower taxes 
if the same restaurant option were available in those communities?’ 47% respondents said 
they would choose restaurants in communities with lower taxes and 53% said otherwise.  
The price variable is a dummy which indicates whether or not price is an important factor 
to the respondent for when choosing a restaurant. Of the sampled respondents 20% said 
price is the most important factor for selecting a restaurant while 80% said price is not the 
most important factor for them in restaurant selection.   
Check tax. This variable captures whether the respondent notices all taxes charged when 
paying a restaurant check. 51% of the sample responded saying they notice all taxes 
charged when paying the check, with 49% saying they do not notice all taxes charged.  
Economic outlook is a dummy for whether respondent believes overall economic outlook 
is improving or not. 56% of the respondents believe that overall economic outlook is 
improving.  
Tax vote is a variable indicating whether the respondent would vote for adding a 
restaurant tax. Respondents were asked if they would vote for adding a tax on restaurant 
meals in their city it the tax revenue was used for promoting tourism or operating an 
arena. Out the sampled respondents, 21% said they would vote in favor of the restaurant 
tax if it would facilitate the promotion of tourism within their city while 79% said they 
wouldn’t vote for such a tax. 
Preference for chain restaurants is a variable that captures the respondent’s inclination 
towards chain restaurants over independent restaurants. On a 5-point likert scale, 
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respondents indicated how strongly they preferred chain restaurants. Out of the sampled 
respondents 26% strongly disagreed, 32% disagreed, 30% were neutral, 10% agreed 
while 1.5% strongly agreed to the question of preference of chain restaurants over 
independent restaurants.  
Table 5-1 Preference for Chain Restaurants over Independent Restaurants  
Prefer chain restaurant Freq. Percent Cum. 
Strongly disagree 297 25.56 25.56 
Disagree 375 32.27 57.83 
Neutral 352 30.29 88.12 
Agree 121 10.41 98.54 
Strongly agree 17 1.46 100 
Total 1,162 100   
 
The variable ‘prefer full service’ indicates the respondent’s preference for full-service 
restaurants over fast-casual or quick service restaurants. The 5-point likert scale captured 
respondent’s level of preference for full service restaurants. Out of the sampled 
respondents 1.2% strongly disagreed, 11% disagreed, 30% were neutral, 38% agreed 
while 20% strongly agreed to the question of preference of full-service restaurants over 
fast-casual and/or quick-service restaurants.  
Table 5-2 Preference for Full-service Restaurants over Quick-service Restaurants  
Prefer full service  Freq. Percent Cum. 
Strongly disagree 14 1.2 1.2 
Disagree 131 11.27 12.48 
Neutral 349 30.03 42.51 
Agree 441 37.95 80.46 
Strongly agree 227 19.54 100 
Total 1,162 100   
 
‘Prefer local foods’ is a variable that expresses respondents’ penchant for restaurants that 
use local foods in their menu offerings. Respondent preferences were recorded on a 5-
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point likert scale. Out of the sampled households who responded to this section 2% 
strongly disagreed, 4% disagreed, 31% were neutral, 39% agreed while 23% strongly 
agreed to the question of preference of restaurants that use local foods in their menu 
offerings. 
Table 5-3 Preference for Local Food on Menu Offerings 
Prefer local foods menu Freq. Percent Cum. 
Strongly disagree 23 1.98 1.98 
Disagree 45 3.87 5.85 
Neutral 364 31.33 37.18 
Agree 457 39.33 76.51 
Strongly agree 273 23.49 100 
Total 1,162 100   
 
Socio-demographic Variables  
The demographic variables reported included respondent’s age2 in years presented in 
ranges. The age ranges used for the analysis are 18-30, 31-40, 41-50, 51-60 and above 60. 
This study regards those households that are headed by someone older than 60 years as 
senior households. In our sample 16 % fall within the 18-30 age range, 20% between the 
31-40 age range, 23% in the 41-50 age range, 29% within the 51-60 age range and 13% 
as senior households.  
 
 
                                                          
2 Age and age-squared generally captures the curvilinear nature of the influence of age in 
a model, however we use age ranges in our analysis to enable comparison of different age 
groups in response to taxes.  
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Table 5-4 Distribution of Age Group 
Age range Freq. Percent Cum. 
18 - 30 184 15.83 15.83 
31-40 230 19.79 35.63 
41-50 267 22.98 58.61 
51-60 335 28.83 87.44 
60+ 146 12.56 100 
Total 1,162 100   
 
The highest level of education completed was also provided in categories. Of the sampled 
respondents 0.2% had ‘less than high school degree’, 9 % had a ‘high school degree/GED 
equivalent’, 12% had a ‘2-year college degree’, 25% had a ‘4-year college degree’ and 
54% had a ‘graduate/professional degree’.  
Table 5-5 Distribution of Highest Level of Education Completed  
Education Freq. Percent Cum. 
< High school degree 2 0.17 0.17 
High school/GED equivalent 100 8.61 8.78 
2-year college degree 142 12.22 21 
4-year college degree 294 25.3 46.3 
Graduate/professional degree 624 53.7 100 
Total 1,162 100   
 
The income bracket of respondents’ combined annual household income were also 
gathered and recoded into quintiles to facilitate the analysis. We recode the original 15 
income brackets into five categories: under $20,000 as low income; $20,000-49,999 as 
middle-low income; $50,000-99,999 as middle income; $100,000-149,999 as middle-
high income; and $150,000 plus as high income brackets. Of the respondents, 4% fell 
into the low income bracket, 17% in the middle-low income bracket, 40% in the middle 
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income bracket, 25% in the middle-high income bracket and 14% in the high income 
bracket.  
Table 5-6 Distribution of Income Group 
Income Group Freq. Percent Cum. 
Low income 45 3.87 3.87 
Middle-low 194 16.7 20.57 
Middle income 463 39.85 60.41 
Middle-high 292 25.13 85.54 
High income 168 14.46 100 
Total 1,162 100   
 
Household size
3
. The respondents were asked to indicate the number of persons in their 
household. 17% of the respondents had single-member households, 41% had 2-member 
households, 18% had households comprising 3 members, 16% had 4-member 
households, while 8% of the respondents had more households comprised of 5 or more 
members. 
Table 5-7 Distribution of Household Size 
Household no. Freq. Percent Cum. 
1 203 17.47 17.47 
2 476 40.96 58.43 
3 205 17.64 76.08 
4 187 16.09 92.17 
5 or more 91 7.83 100 
Total 1,162 100   
 
                                                          
3
 We use number of persons to capture the size of food demand of each household.  Lee 
and Brown (1986) include the square of household size in their model to capture the 
effects of economies of scale in food consumption.  
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City Size is a locational categorical variable that was derived from the zip codes provided 
by the respondents. We recode Kentucky’s six city categories into large and small city 
sizes. 70% of the respondents were from large cities that have a population of more than 
20,000. The remaining 30% were from relatively smaller cities with population sizes less 
than 19,000.  
Table 5-8 Distribution of City Classes 
City size (population) Freq. Percent Cum. 
20,000+ 820 70.57 70.57 
8,000-19,999 115 9.9 80.46 
3,000-7,999 178 15.32 95.78 
1000-2,999 28 2.41 98.19 
<999 21 1.81 100 
Total 1,162 100   
 
The respondents’ zip-codes were subsequently pooled together to obtain county-defined 
regions. Some of the counties had few responses - from less than five respondents - 
which may be unrepresentative of the said counties, thus the counties were further 
grouped into area development districts. The figure below displays the average threshold 
price for respondents represented in each of Kentucky’s Area Development District 
(ADD).  
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Figure 5.1 Area Development Districts in Kentucky by Threshold Prices 
 
Threshold price. The threshold price was estimated with the question ‘by how much 
would the total cost of restaurant meals have to increase before you eat less frequently at 
restaurants or change what you typically purchase in a restaurant?’ Respondents were 
shown a scale from 0 to 60% and asked to indicate the percentage increase in cost that 
would lead them to change their restaurant food purchasing habits. The percentage of 
respondents that reported a 3% tax threshold price or less was 6%. The remainder of the 
population reporting between 4-10% tax level was 27%; 35% of the respondents selected 
a tax level between 11-20%; 22% respondents opted for tax levels between 21-30%; 4% 
of the respondents chose a tax level between 31-40%; 3% respondents selected a tax level 
from 41-50%; and 2% of the respondents were willing to select a tax level of 51-60%. 
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Table 5-9 Distribution of Threshold Price 
Threshold price 
(%) Freq. Percent Cum. 
0-3 71 6.11 6.11 
4-10 315 27.11 33.22 
11-20 406 34.94 68.16 
21-30 259 22.29 90.45 
31-40 46 3.96 94.41 
41-50 39 3.36 97.76 
51-60 26 2.24 100 
Total 1,162 100   
 
Figure 5.2 below graphs a histogram of the distribution of the threshold price points for 
households in Kentucky. The observations are slightly skewed to the left, with an average 
threshold price point of 17%. Most of the threshold price point observations were 
clustered at regular intervals of 5, 10, 15, 20 and 25. This presupposes that households 
prefer to report the practicality of working with regular multiples of numbers rather than 
an arbitrary value, to reflect/rank their selection of threshold price point. The censoring of 
the observations at 0 and 60 also inform the empirical model to be used for the analysis. 
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Figure 5.2 Distribution of TPP with Normal Density Curve Imposed 
 
 
Specification of Tobit Model 
The analysis of restaurant tax on meals and how it affects demand for restaurants and 
restaurant meals by different socio-demographic households raises important issues. Of 
the sampled respondents 6% indicated a threshold price of 3% or less. Cumulatively, 
33%, 68% and 90% of the respondents selected a threshold price of 10%, 20% and 30% 
respectively. Moreover 0.4% of the respondents selected a threshold price of 0. 
Excluding the zero/non-positive observations of the threshold price may result in a 
deficiency of the estimation procedure also known as omitted variable bias (this would 
have been more pertinent if a larger percentage of observations in the data was clustered 
at zero). It can be argued that the resultant estimation is a truncated model and inferences 
are made only for the subpopulation known to have positive threshold prices but the 
sample may no longer probabilistic, as it should be according to the sampling procedure 
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for the survey (Cai, 1998). Furthermore, excluding the households reporting zero 
threshold price is tantamount to the assumption that these households and those 
represented by them will not be in the food consumption market or will not purchase 
meals at restaurants. 
The statistical technique generally applied in analyzing the relationship between 
household expenditures and characteristics is the Classical Linear Regression (CLR). 
Using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to estimate the model may result in biased and 
inconsistent estimators because of some missing or zero observations in the survey 
response. The OLS regression treats the upper and lower limits as the actual values thus 
when the variable is censored the coefficients from the analysis will not necessarily 
approach the "true" population parameters as the sample size increases. 
This study employs the use of a Tobit model, also called a censored regression model, 
devised by Tobin (1958) for econometric analysis. Tobit analysis is a theoretically 
preferred technique as it allows the inclusion of zero-value observations. According to 
McCracken and Brandt (1987) and McDonald and Moffitt (1980), the Tobit technique 
not only calls for the inclusion of all observations, which increases estimation efficiency, 
but it also allows estimation of both the quantity responses of households actively making 
restaurant purchases and the quantity responses resulting from changes in the household 
probability of not making any restaurant purchases at all.  In other words, the total 
marginal effects of a household’s characteristics on its threshold price can be 
decomposed into two meaningful components: (a) quantity effects conditional to positive 
threshold prices (conditional effects) and (b) quantity effects solely resulting from the 
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probability that the household moves from zero/no threshold price to positive threshold 
price (market participation effects). 
The Tobit model assumes that the dependent variable has a number of its values clustered 
at a limiting value, usually zero and it uses all observations both those at the limit and 
those above the limit to estimate a regression line. It is designed to estimate linear 
relationships between variables when there is either left- (censoring from below) or right-
censoring (censoring from above) in the dependent variable. Censoring from above takes 
place when cases with a value at or above some threshold, all take on the value of that 
threshold, so that the true value might be equal to the threshold, but it might also be 
higher. In the case of censoring from below, values those that fall at or below some 
threshold are censored. Thus for a censored Y, we observe all the X but know the true 
value of Y for a restricted range of observations. 
The Tobit model is a combination of two models, the probit model which determines 
whether y=0 or y>0 and a truncated regression model for y>0.  The coefficients from 
Tobit estimation can be used to determine both changes in the probability of being above 
the limit and changes in the value of the dependent variable if it is already above the limit 
(McDonald and Moffitt, 1980). The Tobit analysis assumes that the likelihood of the 
FAFH decision and the level of FAFH expenditures are determined by the same set of 
explanatory variables.  
Specifically, we will use the Tobit model to examine if a particular characteristic explains 
threshold price variations when the others are controlled. We can thus estimate an 
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econometric model with a left-censoring at zero threshold price and a right censoring at 
60%.  
The stochastic model underlying Tobit may be expressed as follows: 
𝑦𝑡 =  𝑋𝑡β + 𝜇𝑡      if 𝑋𝑡β + 𝜇𝑡 > 0                  
       = 0                    if 𝑋𝑡β + 𝜇𝑡 ≤ 0, 
       t = 1, 2, …, N, 
where N is the number of observations, 
𝑦𝑡 is the dependent variable, 
𝑋𝑡 is a vector of independent variables, 
 β  is a vector of unknown coefficients and 
𝜇𝑡 is an independently distributed error term assumed to be normal with zero mean and constant 
variance 𝜎2 
 
The Tobit model has a censored normal distribution which includes a conditional 
continuous part as well as a discrete part. The primary dependent variable of our analysis, 
TP (threshold price), is defined as how much the total cost of restaurant meals would 
have to increase before respondents eat less frequently at restaurants or change what they 
typically purchase in a restaurant. We estimate the empirical model of the threshold price 
as a function of income, average cost/expenditure at a restaurant, frequency of restaurant 
visits and other demographic factors. 
Empirical Model: 
 𝑇𝑃𝑃 = 𝛼1 + 𝛼2𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 + 𝛼3𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛼4𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛼5ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 + 𝛼6𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟
+  𝛼7ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑇𝑎𝑥 + 𝛼8𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝛼9𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑙
+ 𝛼10𝑡𝑦𝑝𝐸𝑎𝑡 +  𝛼11𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑓𝑎𝑠𝑡 +  𝛼12𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝐿𝑢𝑛𝑐ℎ
+  𝛼13𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑟 +  𝛼14𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘𝑇𝑎𝑥 + 𝛼15𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑇𝑎𝑥 
+ 𝛼16𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑘 + 𝛼17𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 
+  𝛼18𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡 +  𝛼19𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 
+  𝛼20𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑 + ε 
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where 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖 is the combined household’s annual income, 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 is age category of the 
respondent, 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖   is the highest level of education completed of the respondent, 
𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑i,  is the number of people in the respondents household, 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖 is a dummy 
variable reflecting the gender of the respondent, 𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑖 is a binary variable 
indicative of whether the respondent would opt for restaurants in lower tax communities, 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖 is a dummy variable capturing whether price is an important factor for 
choosing a restaurant, 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖 is the average cost of a typical restaurant breakfast, 
lunch or dinner meal, 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝐸𝑎𝑡𝑖 is a dummy which captures whether the respondent 
typically eats in a restaurant at least once a month, 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑓𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖 is the number of 
times the respondent eats breakfast in a restaurant per month, 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝐿𝑢𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑖  reflects how 
often the respondent eats lunch at a restaurant each month, 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖 captures the 
frequency of dinner at a restaurant per month, 𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑖 is whether the respondent 
notices all taxes charged when paying the restaurant check, 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑖 is whether the 
respondent would vote for adding a restaurant tax if the revenue is used for promoting 
tourism, 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖  is a dummy for whether respondent believes economic 
outlook is improving, 𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 is categorical variable indicating the class of city of the 
respondent’s location, 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖 is a categorical variable that indicates how 
strongly the respondent prefers chain restaurants over independent restaurants, 
𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 is a categorical variable that captures how strongly the respondent prefers 
full-service restaurants to fast-casual/quick-service restaurants, 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑖 is a 
categorical variable that specifies how strongly the respondent prefers restaurants that use 
local foods in their menu offerings. 
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Marginal Effects of the Tobit Model 
The marginal effects are computed for the latent dependent variable, the expected value 
of the dependent variable conditional on being uncensored, the unconditional expected 
value of the dependent variable, and the probability of being uncensored. Following Cong 
(2000), where a is the lower censored limit and b is the upper censored limit, we rewrite 
the Tobit model as: 
𝑦𝑖
∗ = {
𝑦𝑖 ,     𝑖𝑓 𝑎 < 𝑦𝑖 < 𝑏
𝑎, 𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖 ≤ 𝑎
𝑏, 𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖 ≥ 𝑏
 
The four forms of marginal effects are: 
1. The β coefficients themselves which are the changes in the mean of the latent 
dependent variable: 𝛽 = 𝜕𝐸(𝑦
𝑖
)/𝜕𝑥𝑖 
2. The changes in the unconditional expected value of the observed dependent variable: 
𝜕𝐸(𝑦
𝑖
∗)/𝜕𝑥𝑖 
3. The changes in the conditional expected value of the dependent variable: 𝜕𝐸(𝑦
𝑖
∗) | 𝑎 <
𝑦
𝑖
∗ < 𝑏)/𝜕𝑥𝑖 
4. The changes in the probability of being uncensored: 𝜕𝑃(𝑎 < 𝑦
𝑖
∗ < 𝑏)/𝜕𝑥𝑖 
 
In lieu with McDolald and Moffitt (1980), given the expectation of y* as 
E(y*) = P( y* > 0) E( y* | y* > 0),  
the effect of a change in the jth continuous variable of X on E(y*) can be expressed as: 
∂E(y*)/ ∂xj = P(y* > 0) ∂E(y*) | y*  > 0) / ∂xj  + E(y* | y* > 0) ∂P(y* > 0)/ ∂xj 
The coefficients of the Tobit regression may be interpreted as the effect on the 
household’s threshold price as a result of variations in socio-demographic variables and 
preferences restaurant characteristics.   
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Empirical Results & Discussion 
This chapter highlights the results of our empirical model and subsequently delves into a 
discussion of the results. Table 6.1 below lists the behavioral and socio-demographic 
variables with their forms and a prior expected signs. Table 6.2 also gives the descriptive 
statistics of the variables used for the analysis.  
Table 6-1 Variable forms and their expected signs 
Variable Form Expected/Hypothesized Sign 
Threshold price Continuous N/A 
Income Group Categorical + 
Income Continuous + 
Age (age group) Categorical - 
Education Categorical + 
Household number Categorical - 
Gender_male Binary + 
Higher_neighbourhood_tax Binary - 
Price_important Binary - 
Cost_meal  Continuous - 
Freq_breakfast Categorical - 
Freq_lunch Categorical + 
Freq_dinner Categorical + 
Check_tax Binary - 
Vote_tax Binary + 
Economic_outlook Binary + 
City_class Categorical + 
Pref_chain_restaurant Categorical - 
Pref_full_service Categorical + 
Pref_local_food Categorical + 
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Table 6-2 Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Threshold price 1162 17.76 11.77 0 60 
freq_breakfast 1,162 1.89 2.92 0 20 
freq_lunch 1162 5.89 5.16 0 20 
freq_dinner 1162 6.38 4.20 0 20 
avg_price_meal 1162 13.80 7.11 3 48 
higher_neighborhood_tax 1162 0.47 0.50 0 1 
price_important 1162 0.20 0.40 0 1 
check_tax 1162 0.51 0.50 0 1 
economic_outlook 1162 0.56 0.50 0 1 
Vote 1162 0.21 0.40 0 1 
Gender 1162 0.37 0.48 0 1 
household_number 1162 2.56 1.18 1 5 
age_group 1162 3.02 1.27 1 5 
income_group 1162 3.30 1.03 1 5 
Education 1162 4.24 0.98 1 5 
Citysize 1162 1.55 0.96 1 5 
pref_chain_restaurant 1162 2.30 1.01 1 5 
pref_full_service 1162 3.63 0.96 1 5 
pref_local_food 1162 3.78 0.91 1 5 
 
Statistical Analysis/ Modeling Procedure  
All analyses are done using Stata software. The likelihood ratio test statistic is used to test 
for the overall significance of the set of variables included in the varying forms of the 
modeling procedures. The results are tested to ascertain if they are statistically and 
economically significantly different from zero using the alpha-level tests. Robust 
standard errors are used to correct for possible autocorrelation or heteroskedasticity in the 
model specification.  
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Results of the OLS and Tobit Models 
The results of the OLS and Tobit models are shown in Table 6.3 below. The chi-squared 
value of 158, 157.9 and 159 with a corresponding p-value of 0.0000 indicates that the 
variations of our Tobit models are a suitable fit for the analysis of socio-demographic 
characteristics and restaurant preferences of households in Kentucky. The ancillary 
statistic “/sigma” is analogous to the square root of the residual variance in OLS 
regression. The output provides a summary of the number of left-censored, uncensored 
and right-censored values of the Tobit estimations. The first Tobit model has 5 left-
censored observations, 1148 uncensored observations and 9 right-censored observations. 
The second Tobit model, which has a left (from below) censoring, has 5 left-censored 
observations and 1157 uncensored observations. The third Tobit model in our result table 
has 1153 uncensored observations and 9 right censored observations.  
The coefficient estimates of the Tobit models are very similar to that of the OLS model, 
however we focus on the Tobit model with both a left and right censoring. This is 
because we know the true value of our dependent variable (threshold price) for a 
restricted range of observations (0 to 60). The coefficient for frequency of dinner is 
statistically significant at the 0.05 alpha level. It indicates that, ceteris paribus, for each 
additional time that a household eats dinner in a restaurant, the threshold price of that 
household increases by 0.2%. The parameter estimate for higher neighborhood tax is 
statistically significant at the 1% alpha level. All else equal, compared to households that 
did not have the option and/or would not eat at the same restaurant in neighboring 
communities operating with 3-5% lower tax rates, for households that had the option and 
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would go to such lower-rate restaurants, on average, we expect their threshold price to be 
lower by 3%.  
The variable for average cost of meal was statistically significant at the 10% alpha level. 
Ceteris paribus, households that purchase restaurant meals at a higher average cost have a 
0.1% higher threshold price than households who purchase meals at a lower average cost. 
The coefficient estimate for the variable check-tax was significantly at the 1% alpha 
level. Holding all things constant, on average, households who always notice all the taxes 
charged when paying a restaurant check have a 2% lower tax threshold price than 
households who do not notice the taxes charged. The parameter estimate for vote was 
statistically significant at the 5% alpha level. This suggests that households that are 
willing to pay for an additional tax on restaurant meals if the tax would be used in 
promoting tourism have 2% higher threshold price, compared to households that would 
not vote for such a tax. 
The parameter estimate for the age category 51-60 was statistically significant at the 10% 
alpha level. All other things being equal, on average, compared to households aged 
between 18-30, households close to retirement age (51-60) have 2% lower threshold 
price. The coefficients for the low-middle and middle income households was statistically 
significant at the 10% alpha level, that for the middle-high income group was statistically 
significant at the 5% alpha level, while the coefficient for the high income households 
was significant at the 1% alpha level. Ceteris paribus, on average, compared to low 
income households, low-middle income households, middle income households, middle-
high income households and high income households have 3%, 3%, 4% and 8% higher 
threshold prices, respectively.  
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The variables for 2-year college and graduate/professional degree were statistically 
significant and positive at the 10% significant level. The coefficients indicate that, ceteris 
paribus, compared to a household with a high school diploma, a household with some 2-
year college degree and a household with a graduate or professional degree have a 2% 
higher threshold price. There’s no statistical indication of whether having less than a high 
school diploma or having a 4-year college degree compared to a high school diploma 
increases or decreases the households’ threshold price. 
The variable for class of city was not statistically significant. This implies that, all things 
equal, compared to households in 1
st
 and 2
nd
 (the largest) class cities, households in 3
rd
, 
4
th
, 5
th
 and 6
th
 sized cities do not have a higher or lower threshold price points. In other 
words, all things being equal, households that live in larger sized cities do not have a 
higher or lower threshold price, compared to households that live in smaller-sized cities. 
This presupposes that the city within which a household lives, whether rural or urban, has 
no effect on their threshold price. 
The variable representing households that strongly prefer full service over fast-
casual/quick-service restaurants has a statistically significant threshold price at the 10% 
alpha level. Compared to households that are neutral about preferences for full-services 
over quick-service restaurants, households that strongly prefer full-service restaurants 
have a 2% higher threshold price. Conversely, households that do not strongly prefer full-
service restaurants, compared to neutral households, have a 4% lower threshold price. 
This variable is statistically significant at the 0.05 alpha level.  
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In our model, the variable capturing households that do prefer restaurants that serve local 
food was statistically significant at the 5% level. This indicates that households that 
strongly prefer restaurants that offer local foods, compared to neutral households, have a 
2% lower threshold price. However, the variable measuring no strong preference for 
restaurants that serve local foods was statistically significant at the 5% alpha level. 
Households that do not strongly prefer restaurants that serve local foods have a 5% lower 
threshold price, compared to households that are neutral about restaurants that serve local 
foods.  
The number of individuals per household, economic outlook of households, and the 
importance of price did not have any statistically significant effect on the threshold price. 
It was expected that because it costs more to feed a larger household and thus to cut costs, 
one additional person per household may negatively influence threshold price, but this 
was not reflected in the analysis. Some levels of education and the gender of main 
respondent in the household were also not statistically significant. Neither is there any 
statistical significance on the preference of chain restaurants over independent restaurant. 
Table 6-3 Results of OLS Regression and Censored Tobit models for TPP 
VARIABLES 
 
OLS 
 
Tobit1 
 
Tobit2 
(Left-censored) 
Tobit3 
(Right-cen sored) 
Frequency of breakfast 0.140 0.134 0.133 0.141 
 
(0.140) (0.141) (0.140) (0.138) 
Frequency of lunch -0.0941 -0.0980 -0.0955 -0.0966 
 
(0.0792) (0.0786) (0.0780) (0.0785) 
Frequency of dinner 0.233** 0.239** 0.236** 0.236** 
 
(0.0981) (0.0984) (0.0967) (0.0981) 
Avg. cost of meal 0.107* 0.106* 0.105* 0.108* 
 
(0.0575) (0.0579) (0.0573) (0.0571) 
Higher neighborhood tax -2.632*** -2.683*** -2.653*** -2.662*** 
 
(0.698) (0.692) (0.688) (0.690) 
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Table 6-3 (continued) Results of OLS Regression and Censored Tobit models for TPP 
VARIABLES 
 
OLS 
 
Tobit1 
 
Tobit2 
(Left-censored) 
Tobit3 
(Right-cen sored) 
Price important -1.144 -1.144 -1.161 -1.127 
 
(0.841) (0.838) (0.830) (0.835) 
Check tax -1.883*** -1.863*** -1.872*** -1.874*** 
 
(0.711) (0.706) (0.701) (0.704) 
Economic outlook 0.995 0.984 0.987 0.992 
 
(0.731) (0.727) (0.721) (0.726) 
Vote 1.998** 2.055** 2.018** 2.034** 
 
(0.888) (0.885) (0.874) (0.884) 
Gender -0.0691 -0.0488 -0.0506 -0.0676 
 
(0.720) (0.715) (0.710) (0.713) 
2 person household -0.229 -0.278 -0.252 -0.255 
 
(1.067) (1.060) (1.050) (1.059) 
3 person household 0.0420 0.00210 0.0451 -0.000769 
 
(1.232) (1.223) (1.212) (1.222) 
4 person household 0.322 0.297 0.340 0.279 
 
(1.351) (1.340) (1.329) (1.338) 
5-or-more person household -0.896 -0.928 -0.861 -0.964 
 
(1.489) (1.474) (1.466) (1.472) 
Aged 31-40 -1.269 -1.266 -1.277 -1.258 
 
(1.245) (1.235) (1.227) (1.232) 
Aged 41-50 -0.910 -0.892 -0.915 -0.887 
 
(1.295) (1.285) (1.274) (1.283) 
Aged 51-60 -2.097* -2.108* -2.106* -2.099* 
 
(1.195) (1.184) (1.176) (1.183) 
Aged 60+ -0.564 -0.593 -0.572 -0.585 
 
(1.464) (1.452) (1.444) (1.446) 
Low-middle 3.007* 3.055* 3.019* 3.043* 
 
(1.597) (1.578) (1.572) (1.576) 
Middle income 2.805* 2.827* 2.808* 2.823* 
 
(1.616) (1.595) (1.591) (1.593) 
Middle-high 3.753** 3.763** 3.733** 3.782** 
 
(1.790) (1.766) (1.761) (1.764) 
High income 8.130*** 8.176*** 8.073*** 8.232*** 
 
(2.048) (2.039) (2.023) (2.030) 
NB: Standard errors in parentheses 
***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
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Table 6-3(continued) Results of OLS Regression and Censored Tobit models for TPP 
VARIABLES 
 
OLS 
 
Tobit1 
 
Tobit2 
(Left-censored) 
Tobit3 
(Right-cen sored) 
Less than a high school degree 4.535 4.466 4.440 4.561 
 
(4.620) (4.563) (4.562) (4.543) 
2-year college degree 2.317* 2.302* 2.287* 2.333* 
 
(1.405) (1.391) (1.386) (1.386) 
4-year college degree 1.959 1.941 1.938 1.962* 
 
(1.207) (1.191) (1.188) (1.190) 
Graduate/professional degree 2.169* 2.167* 2.155* 2.182** 
 
(1.127) 
(1.111) 
 (1.109) (1.111) 
City size -0.853 -0.896 -0.890 -0.859 
 
(0.731) (0.727) (0.724) (0.722) 
Not_strongly_pref_chain_rest 0.237 0.226 0.234 0.230 
 
(0.984) (0.977) (0.972) (0.973) 
Not_pref_chain_rest 0.235 0.206 0.225 0.216 
 
(0.816) (0.808) (0.805) (0.805) 
Pref_chain_rest 1.641 1.663 1.665 1.638 
 
(1.306) (1.296) (1.285) (1.294) 
Strongly_pref_chain_rest -1.183 -1.133 -1.106 -1.211 
 
(2.049) (2.027) (2.017) (2.024) 
Not_strongly_ pref_fullservice -4.524* -4.484** -4.449* -4.560** 
 
(2.316) (2.278) (2.272) (2.282) 
Not_pref_fullservice -0.393 -0.411 -0.409 -0.395 
 
(1.088) (1.084) (1.075) (1.078) 
Pref_fullservice 0.630 0.638 0.658 0.610 
 
(0.803) (0.796) (0.791) (0.794) 
Strongly_pref_fullservice 2.000* 2.025* 2.010* 2.014* 
 
(1.079) (1.080) (1.067) (1.074) 
Not_strongly__pref_localfoods -4.304** -4.587** -4.558** -4.330** 
 
(1.791) (1.871) (1.865) (1.765) 
Not_pref_localfoods -0.611 -0.645 -0.607 -0.649 
 
(1.929) (1.899) (1.897) (1.898) 
Pref_localfoods -0.831 -0.838 -0.822 -0.848 
 
(0.826) (0.820) (0.814) (0.817) 
Strongly_pref_localfoods -2.317** -2.354** -2.336** -2.336** 
 
(0.989) (0.989) (0.980) (0.981) 
Constant 12.53*** 12.59*** 12.58*** 12.54*** 
 
(2.102) (2.082) (2.072) (2.076) 
R-squared/ sigma 0.125 11.12*** 11.04*** 11.08*** 
  
(0.315) (0.299) (0.312) 
 Observations 1,162 1,162 1,162 1,162 
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Discussion 
The effect of the frequency of meals on the choice of threshold price was broken down 
into breakfast, lunch and dinner frequency effects. The results of the Tobit model suggest 
that frequency of dinner has a significant and positive effect on the choice level of tax 
choke of households. For each additional time that a household visits a restaurant for 
dinner, the threshold price of that household increases by 0.2%. This implies that given 
two households with the same socio-demographic characteristics, if the first household 
visits a restaurant for dinner five times more than the second household then the first 
household would have a threshold price 1% higher than the first household. The 
frequency of breakfast and lunch in our model did not have any statistically significant 
effects on the threshold prices of households. Interestingly however the frequency of 
breakfast had a positive coefficient while the frequency of lunch had a negative 
coefficient in the model.  
In our Tobit model the effect of price on a household’s threshold price was aggregated 
from the price of breakfast, price of lunch and price of dinner. The average price of a 
meal was statistically and positively significant in our model. It presupposes that for 
every extra dollar that a household pays for the price of a meal that household has a 0.1% 
higher threshold price. In other words a household that is willing to pay $5 extra dollars 
for a meal has a 0.5% higher threshold price, on average. 
Consistent with theory and a priori expectation the variable for higher neighborhood tax 
was statistically significant and negative. Compared to households that live in 
communities with higher tax rates who would not choose restaurants in communities that 
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with lower tax rates if the same restaurant option were available in those communities, 
households that would opt for restaurants in lower tax rate communities have a 2% lower 
threshold price. This suggests that all else equal, a household living in a community in 
Kentucky that would not opt for the same kind of restaurant in a neighborhood with 
lower tax rates has a 2% higher threshold price than a household that would take 
advantage of that option and thus the aforementioned household is more willing to pay 
for tax/cost increases in restaurant meals. 
In our model price was not significantly reflected as the most important factor that 
households take into consideration when choosing a restaurant to have a meal. The 
parameter estimate for price, though not statistically significant from zero, shows that 
households who consider price as the most important factor for choosing restaurants may 
have a 1% lower threshold price than households who do not consider price as the most 
important factor for selecting a restaurant.   
All things equal, compared to households who do not notice taxes when paying their 
restaurant check, those households that always notice all taxes charged when paying a 
restaurant check have a lower threshold price of about 2%.  This is consistent with our 
expectations and suggests that households who make a conscious effort to observe the 
taxes that are levied on their restaurant meals are less willing to pay higher tax rates. On 
the other hand, households that seldom or never check the taxes that are levied on their 
restaurant meals have a higher threshold price either because they do not mind paying 
higher tax rates or they are not even aware of taxes imposed or of the tax increases. 
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The economic outlook of households in our model had no significant effect on the level 
of thresh price of the households sampled. However, if the variable were significant it 
would imply that compared to households who do not believe that the overall economic 
outlook is improving, households who believe that the economic outlook is improving 
have a 1% higher threshold price. Thus households with a positive economic outlook 
would be more willing to pay tax/cost increases in restaurant meals while households 
with a negative economic outlook would be less willing to pay cost increases in 
restaurant meals. Hence if a household that initially has a negative economic outlook 
were to assess the economy, observes growth in the various sectors of the economy and 
develop a positive outlook in the process, the threshold price of that household may 
increase. 
The coefficient estimate for “vote” was statistically and positively significant. It suggests 
that households that would vote for a restaurant tax if the proceeds were earmarked to be 
used to support tourism have 2% higher threshold price, compared to households that 
wouldn’t vote for the tax. This clearly indicates that households that are willing to vote 
for a restaurant tax promoting tourism or operating an arena are also more inclined to pay 
for such restaurant meal cost increases, since such households have a higher threshold 
price. On other hand, households that are not willing to vote for a tax no matter what 
cause the generated revenue will be put towards, have a lower threshold price than 
households that are more willing to vote for a tax for a cause.   
In our model, the parameter estimates for gender and household number were not 
statistically different from zero. Nonetheless, male primary respondents may have a 
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lower threshold price compared to female primary respondents which may suggest that 
female primary respondents may be more willing to pay for restaurant tax increases, if 
the variable were significant. Compared to single-households, households with three or 
four members have a positive threshold price and hence may be more willing to pay for 
tax increases on their restaurant meals. On the other hand households with 5 or more 
persons, compared to single-person households, have a negative threshold price and may 
thus be less willing to pay for tax increases.  
We find that some of the parameter estimates for the age ranges were statistically 
significant whilst others were not. Our results show that compared to households aged 
less than 30 years old, all the other older age groups have negative (lower) threshold 
prices. This implies that the households that are less than 30 years old have the highest 
threshold prices and are the most willing to pay restaurant tax increases. Households aged 
between 51 and 60 years have the lowest threshold price; they have a 2% lower threshold 
price compared to households that are less than 30 years old. This may be because this 
age group of households is closer to retirement and are saving towards their retirement 
plans/benefits and consequently are less willing to pay tax increases on the meals they eat 
at restaurants. It could also imply that elderly households would prefer to eat more at 
home than at restaurants. Our results suggest that households that are older than 60 and/or 
at retirement do not have a threshold price significantly different from zero though 
although they have a negative threshold price compared to households less than 30 years 
of age. 
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In line with theory and a priori expectations, when compared to the lowest income group, 
households in the high income range have the highest threshold price. In comparison to 
the lowest income quintile, the low-middle income group has a 3 higher threshold price, 
the middle income group also has a 3% higher threshold price, the middle-high income 
group has a 4% higher threshold price and the high income group has an 8% higher 
threshold price. All equal, high income households have the highest disposable income 
and thus generally do not consider eating out as a luxury, thus their food choice behavior 
would not be affected much by the additional restaurant tax. Households within the high-
income range are the most willing to pay a tax increase on their restaurant meals and they 
would therefore contribute most to the tax revenue generated. This may eliminate the 
potential regressive nature of taxes and render the restaurant tax progressive. 
We find some of the parameter estimates for education in our model to be statistically 
different from zero. It suggests that households that have some 2-year degree or a 
professional degree have a 2% higher threshold price compared to households that have a 
high school certificate or a GED equivalent. The other coefficients though not 
statistically significant, indicate that households with less than a high school degree (or 
equivalent) may have the highest threshold price. In other words, it would appear that 
households with the least level of education are most willing to pay for the meal tax. This 
could be because such households may eat out at restaurants more than they eat at home 
or they spend more on restaurant food than other essentials compared to households with 
higher levels of education. The households with higher levels of education may be more 
willing to spend on higher education, bigger homes or more expensive vacations for their 
families than they are willing to spend on restaurant taxes. A good proportion of 
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households who have some 2-year degree or professional degree could currently be 
students and thus compared to a greater proportion of working households with less than 
a high school degree, the students have a lower disposable income and hence would be 
less willing to spend on increases in taxes on restaurant meals. We can infer and 
justifiably argue that if a household without a high school diploma attains or earns a 
diploma, their threshold price may fall. 
In our model, the coefficients for city class and preference for chain food restaurants 
were not statistically significant. Nevertheless, the coefficients indicate that compared to 
households that live in large cities, households who live in smaller cities may have lower 
threshold prices. With regards to preference for chain restaurants, households that have a 
strong preference for chain restaurants have lower threshold price compared to 
households who are neutral.  
Households that have a strong preference for full service restaurants over causal/quick-
service have a 2% higher threshold price compared to households that are neutral about 
full-service restaurants. It presupposes that households with a strong preference for 
restaurants have an affinity for being waited upon, being served full-course meals and 
getting satisfactory service. This probably makes their restaurant visits more pleasurable 
and hence they would be willing to pay more for worthwhile services. Thus the 
households with strong preference for full-service restaurants are more willing to pay for 
increases in restaurant taxes. On the other hand, households that do not strongly prefer 
full-service restaurants have a 4% lower threshold price compared to households that are 
neutral. 
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The variables for households who do and not have strong preference for restaurants that 
use local foods in their menu offerings were statistically significant. This suggests that 
compared to neutral households, households who do not strongly prefer restaurants that 
use local foods in the menu offerings have a 4% lower threshold price. Households that 
do not strongly prefer local food restaurants may be more open to other restaurant 
options. More restaurant options give the households more flexibility with their restaurant 
choices. The freedom to opt for other restaurants may be a contributing factor to their 
lower threshold prices and may make such households less willing to pay for restaurant 
tax increases. Quite unexpected, households who strongly prefer local food restaurants 
have a 2% lower threshold price compared to neutral households. This may be so because 
households that have a strong preference for local foods may already be paying a price 
premium for their meals. Thus they may not be as willing to pay for any further cost 
increases in their restaurant meals. As a result households that are neutral to local food 
restaurants may have the highest threshold price and may be more willing to pay for 
restaurant meal cost increases. 
Case Study 
Households makes purchases at restaurants out of total disposable income, thus they 
cannot spend more than their total household income. In the event of an increase in the 
cost of their restaurant meals, the household might reduce food expenditures to defray 
costs, leave expenditures unchanged or increase expenditures to be able to afford the 
same amount of utility as before. The objective of this section is to investigate which 
segment of the population would be most affected by a cost increase in restaurant meals 
and to recommend whether or not to impose a cost increase and how to segment it. 
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If a cost increase is imposed, who would reduce their consumption and by how much?  
For the purposes of this study, I examine the general case of a 5 percent cost increase in 
restaurant meals. I choose a 5% increase because it’s not lower than the legislature-
proposed increase in restaurant taxes and it is high enough to make room/allow for 
contingencies.  The data may not tell us by how much households would change their 
restaurant expenditures when a cost increase is imposed but it tells us who would, say 
low-income households.  
Demographics - who can/cannot afford a 5% tax and where do they live? To ascertain 
who would be able to afford a 5% cost increase in their restaurant meals I use 2012 
estimates of county-level data from Census Bureau to estimate threshold price. I rerun the 
initial regression with continuous variables in place of the categorical variables for age, 
income, education and household size.  
𝑇𝑃 = 𝛼1 + 𝛼2𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝛼3𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 + ε 
Using the coefficient estimates I plug the average values into the regression equation.  I 
hypothesize that if the TP is lower than 5% then the tax should not be imposed. If 
however the TP is greater than 5% then the tax can be imposed in that county/city. The 
base line value of the TP regression was 13.09. Depending of the unique characteristics 
of a county/city this value may rise or fall as an indication of its willingness to pay for a 
cost increase in restaurant meals.  
Oldham County is considered one of the wealthiest counties in Kentucky and has the city 
of La Grange as its county seat. According to the 2012 census estimates, Oldham County 
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has a 53% male population, an average of 2.9 persons per household, an average age of 
39 years, $83,164 median income and an average of 20years of schooling. The city of La 
Grange, with a population of 8,231 (2012 estimates) and is ranked as a 4
th
 size city. 
Plugging these demographics into the regression, the TP value for the city of Lagrange 
was estimated to be 15.6. Hence all things equal, the city of La Grange would be willing 
to pay for a cost increase of up to 16% in their restaurant meals. Thus a meal tax in this 
city may be imposed without any significant change is the purchasing behavior of the 
households. 
Subsequently I consider the case of a less populous, less wealthy county. Owsley County 
is the least wealthy and second-least populous county in Kentucky and has the city of 
Booneville as its county seat. According to 2012 Census Bureau estimates, Owsley 
County has a 52% male population, an average of 2.8 persons per household, average age 
of 44 years, $19,624 median income and an average of 16 years of schooling. Now 
Booneville, ranked as a 6
th
 size- city has a population of 80 (2012 estimates). With these 
demographic values, the TP for Booneville was estimated to be 11.6. Thus all things 
equal, Boonville would be willing to pay for a cost increase of up to 12% in their 
restaurant meals.  
In general, urban cities are likely to be more willing to bear a higher cost increase in their 
restaurant meals compared to rural cities. Among all the demographic variables, the 
median income was the most significant determinant of the city’s TP. Nonetheless all the 
counties within the Common wealth of Kentucky would be able to impose a 3% 
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restaurant tax without a considerable change in restaurant frequency and meal purchasing 
behavior of its residents.  
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Summary & Conclusion  
The purpose of this study was to examine the level of tax that would cause Kentuckians 
to either eat in restaurants less frequently or change what they typically purchase in 
restaurants. The study was designed to investigate if there were significant relationships 
between socio-demographic characteristics of households in Kentucky and the threshold 
price of restaurant meals and also to determine the marginal effects of the significant 
variables. Additionally we investigate whether restaurant characteristics (e.g. chain 
restaurants or local food restaurants) also influence the threshold prices of households. 
The objective was achieved using empirical Tobit models for the analysis augmented 
with survey data. 
Summary of Methodology 
The data for the study was obtained from an online survey of households in Kentucky. 
The respondents responded to various questions concerning their restaurant meal 
consumption behavior including their frequency of restaurant visits and meal 
consumption, average amount spent per meal and the level of increase in the total cost of 
their “usual” restaurant meal that would cause them to eat less frequently in restaurants or 
change what they would typically purchase. The respondents were also asked to rank 
their preferences for specific restaurant attributes in two different scenarios involving no 
tax or a 3% tax. Other socio-demographic characteristics including age, income level and 
gender were captured in the survey. 
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A Tobit model was applied to the survey data to analyze the choice of level of tax that 
would influence households of different socio-demographic characteristics in Kentucky 
to eat less frequently at restaurants or change what they would typically purchase. The 
Tobit model enables the inclusion of both zero and non-zero responses of threshold price 
in the analysis, increasing the efficiency of the estimation procedure. The Tobit model is 
censored at zero from below since respondents cannot choose negative threshold prices 
and censored at sixty from above in regards to the survey question which restricted the 
respondents from selecting a threshold price above sixty even if they had a threshold 
price greater than sixty, though not likely. The marginal effects of the Tobit model 
indicate the effects of household socio-demographic characteristics and restaurant 
preferences on the threshold price. 
Summary of Findings 
Based on the tax choke model specification, our results reveal stimulating insights about 
the socio-demographic characteristics as well as restaurant preferences and food choices 
that affect the level of tax that would cause households in Kentucky to eat less frequently 
at restaurants or change what they would typically purchase. We find that for every 
additional dinner that a household has at a restaurant, the household’s threshold price 
increases by 0.2%. Households that live in higher tax rate communities and would travel 
to restaurants in lower tax rate communities have a 3% lower threshold price compared to 
households that would not travel to eat in the lower tax rate communities. The threshold 
price for households that would vote for a restaurant tax if proceeds were used for 
tourism is 2% higher than households that would not vote for the tax. Households who 
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notice all taxes when paying their restaurant bills have 2% lower threshold price than 
household who tend not to observe the taxes. 
In comparison to households aged less than 30 years, households between the ages of 51-
60 have 2.9% lower threshold prices. Compared to low income households, low-middle 
and middle income households have a 3% higher threshold price, middle-high income 
households have a 4% higher threshold price and high income households have an 8% 
higher threshold price. With reference to households that have less than a high school 
diploma, households that have obtained a 2-year degree or a graduate degree have a 2% 
lower threshold price. Households that strongly prefer full-service restaurants have a 2% 
higher tax Threshold price than households that are neutral. Households that do not 
strongly prefer restaurants that use local foods in their menu offerings have a 5% lower 
threshold price than households that are neutral to local foods. 
Policy Implications/Recommendations 
The findings have several potential implications for stakeholders: consumers, restaurant 
owners, tourism boards and the legislature alike. To effectively meet the needs of 
Kentucky’s growing population, government policymakers, restaurant business owners, 
marketing experts, and hospitality and tourism planners must be informed about the 
consumption and/or spending patterns of consumers in response to the restaurant tax of 
increases. Differing socio-demographic characteristics and fragmented market segments 
of the population may result in differing expenditure and consumption patterns between 
the young and old, more and less educated, the more and less rich and even males and 
females. 
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 Cross comparisons of the different socio-demographic profiles would allow 
legislation/marketing to target segments that contribute most to the bottom line. For 
example households within the highest income bracket ($150,000 and above) have the 
highest threshold prices, and thus their food choice/ meal consumption behavior is likely 
to remain the same irrespective of whether a tax is levied or not. On the other hand 
households that are headed by retirees or individuals close to retirement are negatively 
affected by the tax and thus such households would be less willing to pay the tax and 
adjust their consumption patterns accordingly. Thus tax/price promotions would yield a 
more profitable outcome if they focus specifically on households headed by retirees for 
example. The proportion of elderly in the population will continue to increase as the baby 
boom generation advances in age. Expenditure patterns on FAFH by the elderly is 
noteworthy for business owners, designers of food related programs, policies, goods and 
services to effectively meet the needs of the elderly while taking full advantage of their 
purchasing patterns. 
Household income was found to be a significant and positive factor accounting for 
positive variations of threshold prices. Higher income levels and/or an increase in income 
levels increases the level at which an individual will change his/her choice of restaurant 
or meal. The results conform to theoretical expectations. As spelled out by Cai (1998), 
decomposing market into current and potential markets is significant for research practice 
since by focusing narrowly on existing consumer base, there’s the possibility of forgoing 
a potentially more profitable market segment. High income households do not consider 
eating in restaurants as a luxury and wouldn’t change their meal selection based solely on 
small percentage increase in restaurant tax. These households tend to frequent sit-down 
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restaurants more often than they would fast-food joints. Because of their higher 
disposable incomes, high-income households are least likely to change their purchasing 
behavior as a result of even fairly large sales tax on restaurant meals. Thus the tax poses 
no direct cost (or benefit) to high income households. On the other hand the results show 
that lower-income households are the most likely to change their purchasing behavior in 
efforts to evade/circumvent the tax. 
Households’ interests in consuming local foods have increased over the years with 
marketing trends proliferating ‘local’ brands and menus. We infer from our model that 
households who least strongly prefer restaurants that include local foods on menu 
offerings are least likely to be willing to pay for even small restaurant tax increases. Thus 
promotion of menu items with local branding or identification of where the ingredients 
were grown may not appeal to this segment of the population. Such households may not 
be willing to pay a premium for restaurant meals even if they know that the food items 
are from local sources.  
Caveats   
This analysis has a number of limitations. First of all, the survey was self-administered, 
which may have led to under- or over-reporting. The responses and ratings by the survey 
respondents were self-generated and self-reported, and as such, the observations may or 
may not be representative of their true characteristics or opinions. Secondly, since the 
sample group for this research was obtained from individuals with publically available 
email addresses, primarily college and university websites throughout Kentucky, the 
sample may be skewed towards the characteristics, views and opinions of more 
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professors and persons closely associated with academic institutions. Thirdly, the mental 
behavior of the respondents is unobservable and may not be entirely responsive to any 
cues afforded by the survey instrument. Last but not least, the social, economic and 
demographic characteristics of the sample are neither representative of the 
commonwealth of Kentucky nor of the United States thus our results deduced from our 
sample may not apply to the United States as a whole.  
 
Future Studies 
In subsequent studies, other econometric techniques can be exploited to validate the 
consistency of the findings and extended to include other relevant variables that associate 
consumers’ tax behavior to income ranges and other socio-demographic variables. 
Further studies can evaluate a time series analysis and track the changes in respondent 
restaurant patronizing behavior with respect to taxes over time. 
A subsequent survey could elicit expenditures responses on restaurant meals for scenarios 
before and after the potential tax instrument. An analysis on expenditure patterns could 
provide information about how much varying income groups spend on FAFH before and 
after tax; the post-tax increase in food expenditure per person per week. Also the welfare 
loss to consumers and restaurant owners as well as the percent increase/decrease in 
potential revenue for the state could be analyzed.  
Future studies could explore the possibility of a 3% tax being low enough to leave 
restaurant choice and meal selection behavior unchanged and high enough to generate 
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substantial revenue. Of the revenue generated, the percent accumulated from each of the 
income tiers of consumers’ expenditure/purchases could also be inferred.  
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Appendix 
 
Key survey question used for thesis: 
By how much would the total cost of restaurant meals have to increase before you 
would eat in restaurants less frequently or change what you typically purchase in 
restaurants? 
 
 
 
Click the line to indicate the percentage increase in cost that would lead you to eat in restaurants 
less frequently or change what you typically purchase in restaurants.  
(For  more than 60%, select 60.) 
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